31 Questions and Answers about
the Internal Revenue Service
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1. Is
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) an organization within the U.S. Department
of the Treasury?
Answer: No.
The IRS is not an organization within the United States
Department of the Treasury. The U.S.
Department of the Treasury was organized by statutes now codified in Title 31 of the United States
Code, abbreviated “31 U.S.C.” The only
mention of the IRS anywhere in 31 U.S.C. §§ 301‑313 is an authorization for the President to
appoint an Assistant General Counsel in the U.S. Department of the Treasury to
be the Chief Counsel for the IRS. See 31 U.S.C. 301(f)(2).
At footnote 23
in the case of Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court
admitted that no organic Act for the IRS could be found, after they searched
for such an Act all the way back to the Civil War, which ended in the year 1865
A.D. The Guarantee Clause
in the U.S.
Constitution guarantees the Rule of Law to all Americans (we are to be
governed by Law and not by arbitrary bureaucrats). See Article IV,
Section 4. Since there was no
organic Act creating it, IRS is not a lawful organization.
2. If
not an organization within the U.S. Department of
the Treasury, then what exactly is the IRS?
Answer: The IRS appears to be a collection agency
working for foreign banks and operating out of Puerto Rico under color of the
Federal Alcohol Administration (“FAA”).
But the FAA was promptly declared unconstitutional inside the 50 States
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v. Constantine, 296 U.S.
287 (1935), because Prohibition
had already been repealed.
In 1998,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit identified a second
“Secretary of the Treasury” as a man by the name of Manual Díaz-Saldaña. See the definitions of “Secretary”
and “Secretary
or his delegate” at 27 CFR 26.11
(formerly 27 CFR 250.11), and the published decision in Used Tire
International, Inc. v. Manual Díaz-Saldaña, court
docket number 97‑2348,
September 11, 1998. Both definitions
mention Puerto Rico.
When all
the evidence is examined objectively, IRS appears to be a money laundry,
extortion racket, and conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering
activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951 and 1961 et seq. (“RICO”). Think of Puerto RICO (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); in other words, it is an organized
crime syndicate operating under false and fraudulent pretenses. See also the Sherman Act and the Lanham Act.
3. By
what legal authority, if any, has the IRS established offices inside the
50 States of the Union?
Answer: After much diligent research, several
investigators have concluded that there is no known Act of Congress, nor any
Executive Order, giving IRS lawful jurisdiction to operate within any of
the 50 States of the Union.
Their
presence within the 50 States appears to stem from certain Agreements on
Coordination of Tax Administration (“ACTA”), which
officials in those States have consummated with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. A template for
ACTA agreements can be found at the IRS Internet website and in the Supreme Law Library on the
Internet.
However,
those ACTA agreements are demonstrably fraudulent, for example, by expressly
defining “IRS” as a lawful bureau within the U.S. Department of the
Treasury. (See Answer
to Question 1 above.)
Moreover, those ACTA
agreements also appear to violate State laws requiring competitive bidding before
such a service contract can be awarded by a State government to any
subcontractor. There is no evidence to
indicate that ACTA
agreements were reached after competitive bidding processes; on the contrary, the IRS is adamant
about maintaining a monopoly syndicate.
4. Can
IRS legally show “Department of the Treasury” on their outgoing mail?
Answer: No. It
is obvious that such deceptive nomenclature is intended to convey the false impression
that IRS is a lawful bureau or department within the U.S. Department of
the Treasury. Federal laws prohibit
the use of United States Mail for fraudulent purposes. Every piece of U.S. Mail sent from IRS with
“Department of the Treasury” in the return address, is one count of mail fraud. See also 31 U.S.C. 333.
5.
Does the U.S. Department of Justice have power
of attorney to represent the IRS in federal court?
Answer: No.
Although the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) does have power of attorney to
represent federal agencies before federal courts, the IRS is not an “agency” as
that term is legally defined in the Freedom of Information Act
or in the Administrative
Procedures Act. The governments of
all federal Territories are expressly excluded from the definition of
federal “agency” by Act of Congress. See
5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C).
Since IRS
is domiciled in Puerto
Rico (RICO?), it is thereby excluded from the definition of federal
agencies which can be represented by the DOJ.
The IRS Chief Counsel, appointed by the President under authority of 31 U.S.C. 301(f)(2), can appear, or appoint a delegate to appear in federal
court on behalf of IRS and IRS employees.
Again, see the Answer to Question 1 above. As far as powers of attorney are concerned,
the chain of command begins with Congress, flows to the President, and then to
the IRS Chief Counsel, and NOT to the U.S. Department of Justice.
Answer: No.
Neither was properly ratified. In
the case of People v. Boxer (December 1992), docket
number #S-030016, U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer fell totally silent in the face of
an Application to
the California Supreme Court by the People of California, for an ORDER
compelling Senator Boxer to witness the material evidence against the so-called
16th
amendment.
That so‑called “amendment” allegedly authorized federal
income taxation, even though it contains no provision expressly repealing two
Constitutional Clauses mandating that direct taxes must be
apportioned. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court have both ruled that
repeals by implication are not favored. See Crawford Fitting Co. et al. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc.,
482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987).
The
material evidence in question was summarized in AFFIDAVIT’s that were properly
executed and filed in that case. Boxer
fell totally silent, thus rendering those affidavits the “truth of the case.” The so‑called
16th
amendment has now been correctly identified as a major fraud upon the
American People and the United States.
Major fraud against the United States is a serious federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. 1031.
Similarly,
the so-called 14th
amendment was never properly ratified either. In the case of Dyett
v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 270 (1968), the
Utah Supreme Court recited numerous historical facts proving, beyond any
shadow of a doubt, that the so‑called 14th
amendment was likewise a major fraud upon the American People.
Those
facts, in many cases, were Acts of the several State Legislatures voting for or
against that proposal to amend the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Law Library has a collection of
references detailing this major fraud.
The U.S.
Constitution requires that constitutional amendments be ratified by three-fourths
of the several States. As such, their
Acts are governed by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause in the U.S. Constitution.
See Article
IV, Section 1.
Judging
by the sheer amount of litigation its various sections have generated,
particularly Section 1, the so‑called 14th
amendment is one of the worst pieces of legislation ever written in
American history. The phrase “subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States” is properly understood to mean “subject
to the municipal jurisdiction of Congress.”
(See Answer to Question 19 below.)
For this
one reason alone, the Congressional Resolution proposing the so-called 14th
amendment is provably vague and therefore unconstitutional. See 14 Stat. 358-359, Joint Resolution No.
48, June 16, 1866.
7. Where
are the statutes that create a specific liability for federal income
taxes?
Answer: Section 1 of the
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) contains no provisions creating a specific
liability for taxes imposed by subtitle A. Aside from the statutes which apply only
to federal government employees, pursuant to the Public Salary Tax Act, the
only other statutes that create a specific liability for federal income
taxes are those itemized in the definition of “Withholding agent” at IRC
section 7701(a)(16). For example,
see IRC section 1461. A separate liability statute for “employment”
taxes imposed by subtitle
C is found at IRC section 3403.
After a
worker authorizes a payroll officer to withhold taxes, typically by completing
Form W‑4, the payroll officer then becomes a withholding agent who is
legally and specifically liable for payment of all taxes withheld from
that worker’s paycheck. Until such time
as those taxes are paid in full into the Treasury of the United
States, the withholding agent is the only party who is legally liable
for those taxes, not the worker.
See IRC section 7809
(“Treasury of the United States”).
If the
worker opts instead to complete a Withholding Exemption Certificate, consistent
with IRC section 3402(n),
the payroll officer is not thereby authorized to withhold any federal income
taxes. In this latter situation, there is
absolutely no liability for the worker or for the payroll officer; in other words,
there is no liability PERIOD, specifically because there is no withholding
agent.
8.
Can a federal regulation create a specific
liability, when no specific liability is created by the corresponding statute?
Answer: No.
The U.S. Constitution vests all legislative power in the Congress
of the United States. See Article I,
Section 1. The Executive Branch of
the federal government has no legislative power whatsoever. This means that agencies of the Executive
Branch, and also the federal Courts in the Judicial Branch, are prohibited from
making law.
If an Act
of Congress fails to create a specific liability for any tax imposed by that
Act, then there is no liability for that tax.
Executive agencies have no authority to cure any such omission by using regulations
to create a liability.
“[A]n administrative
agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, especially
a liability for a tax or inspection fee.” See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 4 L.Ed.2d 127, 80 S.Ct. 144 (1959), and Independent
Petroleum Corp. v. Fly, 141 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1944) as cited at
2 Am Jur
2d, p. 129, footnote 2 (1962 edition) [bold emphasis added]. However, this cite from American Jurisprudence
has been removed from the 1994 edition of that legal encyclopedia.
9. The
federal regulations create an income tax liability for what specific classes
of people?
Answer: The regulations at 26 CFR 1.1-1 attempted to
create a specific liability for all “citizens of the United States” and all
“residents of the United States”.
However, those regulations correspond to IRC section 1, which does not
create a specific liability for taxes imposed by subtitle A.
Therefore,
these regulations are an overly broad extension of the underlying statutory
authority; as such, they are unconstitutional, null and void ab initio (from the beginning, in
Latin). The Acker case cited
above held that federal regulations can not
exceed the underlying statutory authority.
(See Answer to Question 8 above.)
10. How
many classes of citizens are there, and how did this number come to be?
Answer: There are two (2) classes of citizens: State Citizens and federal citizens. The first class originates in the Qualifications
Clauses in the U.S. Constitution, where the term “Citizen of the United
States” is used. (See 1:2:2, 1:3:3 and 2:1:5.) Notice the UPPER-CASE “C”
in “Citizen”.
The
pertinent court cases have defined the term “United States” in these Clauses to
mean “States United”, and the full term means “Citizen of ONE OF the
States United”. See People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870); Judge Pablo De La Guerra signed the
California Constitution of 1849, when California first joined the Union. Similar terms are found in the
Diversity Clause at Article III,
Section 2, Clause 1, and in the Privileges and Immunities Clause at Article IV,
Section 2, Clause 1. Prior to the
Civil War, there was only one (1) class of Citizens under American Law. See the holding in Pannill
v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914‑915
(1918), for definitive authority on this key point.
The
second class originates in the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
where the term “citizen of the United States” is used. This Act was later codified at 42 U.S.C. 1983. Notice the lower-case “c” in “citizen”. The pertinent court cases have held that
Congress thereby created a municipal
franchise primarily for members of the Negro race, who were freed by
President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation (a war measure), and later by the
Thirteenth
Amendment banning slavery and involuntary servitude. Compelling payment of a “tax” for which there
is no liability statute is tantamount to involuntary servitude, and extortion.
Instead
of using the unique term “federal citizen”, as found in Black’s Law
Dictionary, Sixth Edition, it is now clear that the Radical Republicans who
sponsored the 1866
Civil Rights Act were attempting to confuse these two classes of
citizens. Then, they attempted to
elevate this second class to constitutional status, by proposing a 14th
amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
As we now know, that proposal was never ratified. (See Answer to Question
6 above.)
Numerous
court cases have struggled to clarify the important differences between the two classes. One of the most definitive, and dispositive
cases, is Pannill v. Roanoke, 252
F. 910, 914‑915 (1918), which clearly held that federal citizens had
no standing to sue under the Diversity
Clause, because they were not even contemplated when Article III in
the U.S. Constitution was first being drafted, circa 1787 A.D.
Another
is Ex
parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855)
in which the California Supreme Court ruled that there was no such thing as a
“citizen of the United States” (as of the year 1855 A.D.). Only federal citizens have standing to invoke
42 U.S.C. 1983; whereas State
Citizens do not. See Wadleigh
v. Newhall, 136 F. 941 (C.C. Cal. 1905).
Many more
cases can be cited to confirm the existence of two classes of citizens under
American Law. These cases are thoroughly
documented in the book entitled “The Federal Zone: Cracking
the Code of Internal Revenue” by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.,
now in its eleventh edition. See also
the pleadings in the case of USA v. Gilbertson,
also in the Supreme Law Library.
Answer: Yes.
The 1866 Civil
Rights Act was municipal law,
confined to the District of Columbia and other limited areas where Congress is
the “state” government with exclusive legislative jurisdiction there. These areas are now identified as “the
federal zone.” (Think of it as the blue
field on the American flag;
the stars on the flag are the 50 States.) As such, the 1866 Civil Rights Act
had no effect whatsoever upon the lawful status of
State Citizens, then or now.
Several courts have already recognized our Right to be
State Citizens without also becoming federal citizens. For excellent examples, see State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602 (1889) and Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155,
48 S. 788, 791 (1909). The Maine Supreme Court also clarified
the issue by explaining our “Right
of Election” or “freedom of choice,” namely, our freedom to choose between
two different forms of government. See 44 Maine 518 (1859),
Hathaway, J. dissenting.
Since the Guarantee Clause
does not require the federal government to guarantee a Republican Form of
Government to the federal zone, Congress is free to create a different
form of government there, and so it has.
In his dissenting opinion in Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 at 380 (1901), Supreme Court Justice
Harlan called it an absolute legislative democracy.
But, State Citizens are under no legal obligation to join
or pledge any allegiance to that legislative democracy; their allegiance is to one or more of
the several States of the Union (i.e. the white stars on the American
flag, not the blue field).
12.
Who was Frank Brushaber,
and why was his U.S. Supreme Court case so important?
Answer: Frank Brushaber was
the Plaintiff in the case of Brushaber v.
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 240 U.S. 1 (1916), the
first U.S. Supreme Court case to consider the so‑called
16th
amendment. Brushaber
identified himself as a Citizen of New York State and a resident of the Borough
of Brooklyn, in the city of New York, and nobody challenged that claim.
The Union
Pacific Railroad Company was a federal corporation created by Act of Congress
to build a railroad through Utah (from the Union to the Pacific), at a time
when Utah was a federal Territory, i.e. inside the federal zone.
Brushaber’s attorney committed an error by arguing that the
company had been chartered by the State of Utah, but Utah was not a
State of the Union when Congress first created that corporation.
Brushaber had purchased stock issued by the company. He then sued the company to recover taxes
that Congress had imposed upon the dividends paid to its stockholders. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Frank Brushaber, and upheld the tax as a lawful excise, or indirect
tax.
The most
interesting result of the Court’s ruling was a Treasury Decision (“T.D.”) that
the U.S. Department of the Treasury later issued as a direct consequence of the
high Court’s opinion. In T.D. 2313, the
U.S. Treasury Department expressly cited the Brushaber
decision, and it identified Frank Brushaber as a
“nonresident alien” and the Union Pacific Railroad Company as a “domestic
corporation”. This Treasury Decision has
never been modified or repealed.
T.D. 2313 is
crucial evidence proving that the income tax provisions of the IRC are municipal law, with no
territorial jurisdiction inside the 50 States of the Union. The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury who
approved T.D.
2313 had no authority to extend the holding in the Brushaber
case to anyone or anything not a proper Party to that court action.
Thus,
there is no escaping the conclusion that Frank Brushaber
was the nonresident alien to which that Treasury Decision refers. Accordingly, all State Citizens are
nonresident aliens with respect to the municipal jurisdiction of Congress, i.e.
the federal zone.
13. What
is a “Withholding agent”?
Answer: (See Answer to Question 7
first.) The term “Withholding agent” is
legally defined at IRC section 7701(a)(16). It is further
defined by the statutes itemized in that section, e.g. IRC 1461 where liability
for funds withheld is clearly assigned.
In plain English, a “withholding agent” is a person who is responsible
for withholding taxes from a worker’s paycheck, and then paying those taxes
into the Treasury of the United States, typically on a quarterly basis. See IRC section 7809.
One
cannot become a withholding agent unless workers first authorize taxes to be
withheld from their paychecks. This
authorization is typically done when workers opt to execute a valid W‑4
“Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate.”
In plain English, by signing a W‑4 workers
designate themselves as “employees” and certify they are allowing
withholding to occur.
If
workers do not execute a valid W‑4 form, a company’s payroll
officer is not authorized to withhold any federal income taxes from their
paychecks. In other words, the payroll
officer does not have “permission” or “power of attorney” to withhold taxes, until
and unless workers authorize or “allow” that withholding ‑‑ by
signing Form W‑4 knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily.
Pay
particular attention to the term “Employee” in the title of this form. A properly executed Form W‑4 creates
the presumption that the workers wish to be treated as if they were
“employees” of the federal government.
Obviously, for people who do not work for the federal government, such a
presumption is a legal fiction, at best.
14. What
is a “Withholding Exemption Certificate”?
Answer: A “Withholding Exemption Certificate” is an
alternative to Form W‑4, authorized by IRC section 3402(n) and executed in
lieu of Form W‑4. Although
section 3402(n)
does authorize this Certificate, the IRS has never added a corresponding form
to its forms catalog (see the IRS “Printed Products Catalog”).
In the
absence of an official IRS form, workers can use the language of section
3402(n) to create
their own Certificates. In simple
language, the worker certifies that s/he had no federal income tax liability
last year, and anticipates no federal income tax liability during the current
calendar year. Because there are no
liability statutes for workers in the private sector, this certification is
easy to justify.
Many
public and private institutions have created their own form for the Withholding
Exemption Certificate, e.g. California Franchise Tax Board, and Johns
Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland.
This fact can be confirmed by using any search engine, e.g. google.com, to locate occurrences of the term
“withholding exemption certificate” on the Internet. This term occurs several times in IRC section 3402.
15. What
is “tax evasion” and who might be guilty of this crime?
Answer: “Tax evasion” is the
crime of evading a lawful tax. In the
context of federal income taxes, this crime can only be committed by persons
who have a legal liability to pay, i.e. the withholding
agent. If one is not employed by the
federal government, one is not subject to the Public Salary Tax Act unless one
chooses to be treated “as if” one is a federal government “employee.” This is typically done by executing a valid
Form W‑4.
However,
as discussed above, Form W‑4 is not mandatory for workers who are not “employed”
by the federal government. Corporations
chartered by the 50 States of the Union are technically “foreign”
corporations with respect to the IRC; they are decidedly not the federal
government, and should not be regarded “as if” they are the federal government,
particularly when they were never created by any Act of Congress.
Moreover,
the Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that Congress can only create a
corporation in its capacity as the Legislature for the federal zone. Such corporations are the only “domestic”
corporations under the pertinent federal laws.
This writer’s essay entitled “A Cogent Summary
of Federal Jurisdictions” clarifies this important distinction between
“foreign” and “domestic” corporations in simple, straightforward language.
If
Congress were authorized to create national corporations, such a
questionable authority would invade States’ rights reserved to them by the
Tenth Amendment, namely, the right to charter their own domestic
corporations. The repeal of Prohibition
left the Tenth
Amendment unqualified. See the Constantine
case supra.
For
purposes of the IRC, the term “employer” refers only to federal government
agencies, and an “employee” is a person who works for such an “employer”.
16. Why
does IRS Form 1040 not require a Notary Public to notarize a taxpayer’s
signature?
Answer: This question is one of the fastest ways to
unravel the fraudulent nature of federal income taxes. At 28 U.S.C. section
1746, Congress
authorized written verifications to be executed under penalty of perjury without
the need for a Notary Public, i.e. to witness one’s signature.
This
statute identifies two different formats for such written verifications: (1) those executed outside the “United
States” and (2) those executed inside the “United States”. These two formats correspond to sections
1746(1) and 1746(2), respectively.
What is
extremely revealing in this statute is the format for verifications executed “outside
the United States”. In this latter
format, the statute adds the qualifying phrase “under the laws of the United
States of America”.
Clearly,
the terms “United States” and “United States of America” are both
used in this same statute. They are not
one and the same. The former refers to
the federal government -- in the U.S. Constitution
and throughout most federal statutes.
The latter refers to the 50 States that are united by, and under, the
U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. 1746 is the
only federal statute in all of Title 28 of the United States
Code that utilizes the term “United States of America”, as such.
It is
painfully if not immediately obvious, then, that verifications made under
penalty of perjury are outside the “United States” (read “the
federal zone”) if and when they are executed inside the 50 States of the
Union (read “the State zone”).
Likewise,
verifications made under penalty of perjury are outside the 50 States of
the Union, if and when they are executed inside the “United States”.
The
format for signatures on Form 1040 is the one for verifications made inside
the United States (federal zone) and outside the United States
of America (State zone).
17. Does
the term “United States” have multiple legal meanings and, if so, what
are they?
Answer: Yes. The term has several meanings. The term
"United
States" may be used in any one of several senses. [1]
It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to
that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. [2] It
may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States
extends, or [3] it may be the collective name of the
States which are united by and under the Constitution. See Hooven
& Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)
[bold emphasis, brackets and numbers added for clarity].
This is the very same definition
that is found in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. The second of these three meanings refers to
the federal zone and to Congress only when it is legislating in its municipal
capacity. For example, Congress is
legislating in its municipal capacity whenever it creates a federal
corporation, like the United States Postal
Service.
It is terribly
revealing of the manifold frauds discussed in these Answers, that the
definition of “United States” has now been removed from the
Seventh Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary.
18. Is
the term “income” defined in the IRC and, if not, where is it defined?
Answer: The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals has already ruled that the term “income” is not
defined anywhere in the IRC: “The general term ‘income’ is not defined in the
Internal Revenue Code.” U.S. v. Ballard, 535 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Circuit, 1976).
Moreover, in Mark
Eisner v. Myrtle H. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the high Court told
Congress it could not legislate any definition of “income” because that term
was believed to be in the U.S. Constitution.
The Eisner case
was predicated on the ratification of the 16th
amendment, which would have introduced the term “income” into the U.S. Constitution
for the very first time (but only if that amendment had been properly
ratified).
In Merchant's Loan
& Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921), the high Court
defined “income” to mean the profit or gain derived from corporate
activities. In that instance, the tax is
a lawful excise tax imposed upon the corporate privilege of limited liability, i.e.
the liabilities of a corporation do not reach its officers, employees,
directors or stockholders.
19. What
is municipal law, and are the IRC’s income tax provisions municipal law, or
not?
Answer: Yes.
The IRC’s income tax provisions are municipal law. Municipal law
is law that is enacted to govern the internal affairs of a sovereign
State; in legal
circles, it is also known as Private International Law. Under American Law, it has a much wider
meaning than the ordinances enacted by the governing body of a municipality, i.e.
city council or county board of supervisors.
In fact, American legal encyclopedias define “municipal” to mean
“internal”, and for this reason alone, the Internal Revenue Code is
really a Municipal Revenue Code.
A
mountain of additional evidence has now been assembled and published in the
book “The Federal Zone”
to prove that the IRC’s income tax provisions are municipal law.
One of
the most famous pieces of evidence is a letter from a
Connecticut Congresswoman, summarizing the advice of legal experts employed by
the Congressional Research Service and the Legislative Counsel. Their advice confirmed that the meaning of
“State” at IRC section 3121(e)
is restricted to the named territories and possessions of D.C., Guam,
Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and Puerto Rico.
In other
words, the term “State” in that statute, and in all similar federal statutes,
includes ONLY the places expressly named, and no more.
20. What
does it mean if my State is not mentioned in any of the federal income tax
statutes?
The
general rule is that federal government powers must be expressed and
enumerated. For example, the U.S. Constitution
is a grant of enumerated powers.
If a power is not enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, then Congress
does not have any authority to exercise that power. This rule is tersely expressed in the Ninth
Amendment, in the Bill of
Rights.
If
California is not mentioned in any of the federal income tax statutes,
then those statutes have no force or effect within that State. This is also true of all 50 States.
Strictly
speaking, the omission or exclusion of anyone or any thing
from a federal statute can be used to infer that the omission or exclusion was intentional
by Congress. In Latin, this is tersely
stated as follows: Inclusio
unius est
exclusio alterius. In English, this phrase is literally
translated: Inclusion of one
thing is the exclusion of all other things [that are not
mentioned]. This phrase can be found in
any edition of Black’s Law Dictionary; it is a maxim of statutory construction.
The many different
definitions of the term “State” that are found in federal laws are
intentionally written to appear as if they include the 50 States PLUS
the other places mentioned. As the legal experts in
Congress have now confirmed, this is NOT the correct way to interpret,
or to construct, these statutes.
If a
place is not mentioned, every American may correctly infer that the omission of
that place from a federal statute was an intentional act of
Congress. Whenever it wants to do so,
Congress knows how to define the term “United States” to mean the 50 States of
the Union. See IRC section 4612(a)(4)(A).
21. In
what other ways is the IRC deliberately vague, and what are the real
implications for the average American?
There are
numerous other ways in which the IRC
is deliberately vague. The absence of any
legal definition for the term “income” is a classic deception. The IRS enforces the Code as a tax on
everything that “comes in,” but nothing could be further from the truth. “Income” is decidedly NOT everything that
“comes in.”
More
importantly, the fact that this vagueness is deliberate is sufficient
grounds for concluding that the entire Code is null, void and unconstitutional,
for violating our fundamental Right to know the nature and cause of any
accusation, as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment in the Bill of
Rights.
Whether
the vagueness is deliberate or not, any statute is unconstitutionally
void if it is vague. If a statute is
void for vagueness, the situation is the same as if it had never been
enacted at all, and for this reason it can be ignored entirely.
22. Has
Title 26 of the United
States Code (“U.S.C.”) ever been enacted into positive law, and what are
the legal implications if Title 26 has not been enacted into positive
law?
Answer: No.
Another, less obvious case of deliberate deception is the statute at IRC
section 7851(a)(6)(A), where it states that the provisions of subtitle F shall take
effect on the day after the date of enactment of “this title”. Because the term “this title” is not defined anywhere
in the IRC, least of all in the section dedicated to definitions, one is forced
to look elsewhere for its meaning, or to derive its meaning from context.
Throughout
Title 28 of the United
States Code -- the laws which govern all the federal courts -- the term “this
title” clearly refers to Title 28. This
fact would tend to support a conclusion that “this title”, as that term is used
in the IRC, refers to Title 26 of the United States Code. However, Title 26 has never been enacted
into positive law, as such.
Even
though all federal judges may know the secret meaning of “this title”, they are
men and women of UNcommon
intelligence. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
test for vagueness is violated whenever men and women of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning and differ as
to the application of a vague statute.
See Connally et al.
v. General Construction Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Thus, federal judges are applying the wrong
test for vagueness.
Accordingly,
the provisions of subtitle
F have never taken effect. (“F” is
for enForcement!) This subtitle contains all of the
enforcement statutes of the IRC,
e.g. filing requirements, penalties for failure to file and tax evasion,
grants of court jurisdiction over liens, levies and seizures, summons
enforcement and so on.
In other
words, the IRC is a big pile
of Code without any teeth;
as such, it can impose no legal obligations upon anyone, not even
people with dentures!
23. What
federal courts are authorized to prosecute income tax crimes?
This
question must be addressed in view of the Answer to Question 22
above. Although it may appear
that certain statutes in the IRC
grant original jurisdiction to federal district courts, to institute
prosecutions of income tax crimes, none of the statutes found in subtitle F has ever
taken effect. For this reason, those
statutes do not authorize the federal courts to do anything at all. As always, appearances can be very
deceiving. Remember the Wizard of Oz
or the mad tea party of Alice in Wonderland?
On the
other hand, the federal criminal Code at Title 18, U.S.C., does grant
general authority to the District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) to prosecute
violations of the statutes found in that Code.
See 18 U.S.C.
3231.
It is
very important to appreciate the fact that these courts are not the same as the
United States District Courts (“USDC”). The DCUS are constitutional courts
that originate in Article III of
the U.S. Constitution. The USDC are
territorial tribunals, or legislative courts, that originate in Article IV,
Section 3, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, also known as the Territory
Clause.
This
author’s OPENING
BRIEF to the Eighth Circuit on behalf of the Defendant in USA v. Gilbertson
cites numerous court cases that have already clarified the all important
distinction between these two classes of federal district courts. For example, in Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1922),
the high Court held that the USDC belongs in the federal Territories. This author’s OPENING BRIEF to the
Ninth Circuit in Mitchell
v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al. develops this theme in even greater
detail; begin
reading at section “7(e)”.
The USDC, as
such, appear to lack any lawful authorities to prosecute income tax
crimes. The USDC are legislative
tribunals where summary proceedings dominate.
For
example, under the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 1292, the
U.S. Courts of Appeal have no appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory
orders issued by the USDC. Further
details on this point are available in the Press Release
entitled “Private
Attorney General Cracks Title 28 of the United States Code” and dated November
26, 2001 A.D.
24. Are
federal judges required to pay income taxes on their pay, and what are the real
implications if they do pay taxes on their pay?
Answer: No.
Federal judges who are appointed to preside on the District Courts of
the United States –- the Article III constitutional
courts –- are immune from any taxation of their pay, by constitutional
mandate.
The fact
that all federal judges are currently paying taxes on their pay is proof of
undue influence by the IRS, posing as a duly authorized agency of the Executive
Branch. See Evans v. Gore, 253
U.S. 245 (1920).
Even
if the IRS were a lawful bureau or department within the U.S. Department of
the Treasury (which they are NOT), the existence of undue influence by the
Executive Branch would violate the fundamental principle of Separation of
Powers. This principle, in theory, keeps
the 3 branches of the federal government confined to their respective areas,
and prevents any one branch from usurping the lawful powers that rightly belong
to the other two branches.
The
Separation of Powers principle is succinctly defined in Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); however, in that decision the Supreme Court
erred by defining “Party” to mean only Plaintiffs in Article III,
contrary to the definition of “Party” that is
found in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856).
The
federal judiciary, contemplated by the organic U.S. Constitution,
was intended to be independent and unbiased.
These two qualities are the essence, or sine qua non of judicial
power, i.e. without which there is nothing. Undue influence obviously violates these two
qualities. See Evans v. Gore supra.
In Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp.
167, 169 (1965), the federal judge in that case was honest enough to admit, in
his published opinion, that federal judges routinely rule in favor of the
IRS, because they fear the retaliation that might result from ruling against
the IRS. There you have it, from the
horse’s mouth!
In front
of a class of law students at the University of Arizona in January of 1997,
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist openly admitted that all federal
judges are currently paying taxes on their judicial pay. This writer was an eyewitness to that statement by the
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court -– the highest Court in the land.
Thus, all
federal judges are now material witnesses to the practice of concealing
the Withholding Exemption Certificate from them, when they were first hired as
“employees” of the federal judiciary. As
material witnesses, they are thereby disqualified from presiding on all federal
income tax cases.
25. Can
federal grand juries issue valid indictments against illegal tax protesters?
Answer: No.
Federal grand juries cannot issue valid indictments against illegal tax
protesters. Protest has never
been illegal in America, because the First
Amendment guarantees our fundamental Right to express our objections to any
government actions, in written and in spoken words.
Strictly
speaking, the term “illegal” cannot modify the noun “protesters” because to do
so would constitute a violation of the First
Amendment in the Bill of Rights, one of the most magnificent constitutional
provisions ever written.
Accordingly,
for the term “illegal tax protester” to survive this obvious constitutional
challenge, the term “illegal” must modify the noun “tax”. An illegal tax protester is, therefore,
someone who is protesting an illegal tax.
Such an act of protest is protected by the First
Amendment, and cannot be a crime.
Protest
is also recognized and honored by the Uniform Commercial Code; the phrases “under
protest” and “without prejudice” are sufficient to reserve all of one’s
fundamental Rights at law. See U.C.C. 1-207 (UCCA
1207 in California).
By the
way, the federal U.C.C. is also municipal law. See the Answer to Question 19
above, and 77 Stat. 630, P.L. 88‑243, December
30, 1963 (one month after President John F. Kennedy was murdered).
26. Do
IRS agents ever tamper with federal grand juries, and how is this routinely
done?
Answer: Yes.
IRS agents routinely tamper with federal grand juries, most often by
misrepresenting themselves, under oath, as lawful employees and “Special
Agents” of the federal government, and by misrepresenting the provisions of subtitle F as having any
legal force or effect. Such false
representations of fact violate Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, uncodified at 15 U.S.C. 1125(a). (Title 15 of the United States
Code has not been enacted into positive law either.)
They
tamper with grand juries by acting as if “income” is everything that “comes
in”, when there is no such definition anywhere in the IRC. Such false descriptions of fact also violate
Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.
They
tamper with grand juries by presenting documentary evidence which they had no
authority to acquire, in the first instance, such as bank records. Bank signature cards do not constitute
competent waivers of their customers’ fundamental Rights to privacy, as secured
by the Fourth
Amendment. The high standard for
waivers of fundamental Rights was established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brady
v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
IRS
agents tamper with grand juries by creating and maintaining the false
and fraudulent pretenses that the IRC
is not vague, or that the income tax provisions have any legal force or effect
inside the 50 States of the Union, when those provisions do not.
These are
all forms of perjury, as well, and possibly also misprision of perjury by
omission, i.e. serious federal offenses.
Finally,
there is ample evidence that IRS agents bribe U.S. Attorneys, federal judges,
and even the Office of the President with huge kickbacks, every
time a criminal indictment is issued by a federal grand jury against an illegal
tax protester. (See the Answer to Question 25 above.)
These kick‑backs range from $25,000 to $35,000 in CASH! They also violate the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986,
which penalizes the payment of kickbacks from federal government
subcontractors. See 41 U.S.C. 51 et seq.
As a
trust domiciled in Puerto
Rico, the IRS is, without a doubt, a federal government subcontractor that
is subject to this Act. See 31 U.S.C. 1321(a)(62). The systematic
and premeditated pattern of racketeering by IRS employees also establishes
probable cause to dismantle the IRS permanently for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act,
first enacted in the year 1890 A.D.
See 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (uncodified at 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.)
27. What
is “The Kickback Racket,” and where can I find evidence of its existence?
The
evidence of this “kickback
racket” was first discovered in a table of delegation orders, on a page
within the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) -- the internal policy and procedure
manual for all IRS employees.
Subsequently,
this writer submitted a lawful request, under the Freedom of Information Act,
for a certified list of all payments that had ever been made under color of
these delegation orders in the IRM. Mr.
Mark L. Zolton, a tax law specialist within the
Internal Revenue Service, responded on IRS
letterhead, transmitted via U.S. Mail, that few
records existed for these “awards” because most of them were paid in cash!
When this
evidence was properly presented to a federal judge, who had been asked to
enforce a federal grand jury subpoena against a small business in Arizona, he
ended up obstructing all 28 pieces of U.S. Mail we had transmitted to that
grand jury.
Obstruction
of correspondence is a serious federal offense, and federal judges have no
authority whatsoever to intercept U.S. Mail. See 18 U.S.C. 1702.
Obviously,
the federal judge -- John
M. Roll -- did NOT want the grand jury in that case to know anything
about these kickbacks. They found out anyway,
because of the manner
in which this writer defended that small business, as its Vice President for
Legal Affairs.
28. Can
the IRS levy bank accounts without a valid court order?
Answer: No.
The Fifth
Amendment prohibits all deprivations of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Due
Process of Law is another honored and well developed feature of American
constitutional practice. Put simply, it
requires Notice and Hearing before any property can be seized by any
federal government employees, agents, departments or agencies.
A levy
against a bank account is a forced seizure of property, i.e. the funds
on deposit in that account. No such
seizure can occur unless due process of law has first run its course. This means notice, hearing, and deliberate
adjudication of all the pertinent issues of law and fact.
Only after this process has run its proper or “due” course,
can a valid court order be issued.
The holding in U.S. v.
O’Dell, 160 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1947), makes
it very clear that the IRS can only levy a bank account after first obtaining a
Warrant of Distraint, or court ORDER. And, of course, no court ORDER could ever be
obtained unless all affected Parties had first enjoyed their “day in court.”
29. Do
federal income tax revenues pay for any government services and, if so, which
government services are funded by federal income taxes?
Answer: No.
The money trail is very difficult to follow, in this instance, because
the IRS is technically a trust with a domicile in Puerto Rico. See 31 U.S.C. 1321(a)(62). As such, their
records are protected by laws which guarantee the privacy of trust records
within that territorial jurisdiction, provided that the trust is not also
violating the Sherman
Antitrust Act.
They are
technically not an “agency” of the federal government, as that term is defined
in the Freedom of
Information Act and in the Administrative Procedures
Act. The governments of the federal
territories are expressly excluded from the definition of “agency” in
those Acts of Congress. See 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C). (See also the
Answer to Question 5 above.)
All
evidence indicates that they are a money laundry, extortion racket, and
conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18
U.S.C. 1951 and 1961
et seq.
They
appear to be laundering huge sums of money into foreign banks, mostly in
Europe, and quite possibly into the Vatican.
See the national policy on money laundering at 31 U.S.C. 5341.
The final
report of the Grace Commission, convened under President Ronald Reagan, quietly
admitted that none of the funds they collect from federal income taxes goes to
pay for any federal government services.
The Grace Commission found that those funds were being used to pay for
interest on the federal debt, and income transfer payments to beneficiaries of
entitlement programs like federal pension plans.
30. How
can the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) help me to
answer other key tax questions?
The availability
of correct information about federal government operations is fundamental to
maintaining the freedom of the American People.
The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), at 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., was intended to make government
documents available with a minimal amount of effort by the People.
As long as a
document is not protected by one of the reasonable exemptions itemized in the FOIA, a requester need
only submit a brief letter to the agency having custody of the requested
document(s). If the
requested document is not produced within 20 working days (excluding weekends
and federal holidays), the requester need only prepare a single appeal letter.
If the requested
document is not produced within another 20 working days after the date of the
appeal letter, the requester is automatically allowed to petition a District
Court of the United States (Article III DCUS, not the Article IV
USDC) --
to compel production of the requested document, and judicially to enjoin
the improper withholding of same. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B). The general
rule is that statutes conferring original jurisdiction on federal district
courts must be strictly construed.
This writer has
pioneered the application of the FOIA to request
certified copies of statutes and regulations which should exist, but do not
exist. A typical request anyone can
make, to which the U.S. Treasury has now fallen totally silent, is for a
certified copy of all statutes which create a specific liability for taxes
imposed by subtitle A
of the IRC. For example, see the FOIA
request that this writer prepared for author Lynne Meredith.
Of course, by now
we already know the answer to this question, before asking it. (Good lawyers always know the answers to
their questions, before asking them.)
It should also
be clear that such a FOIA request should not be directed to the IRS, because
they are not an “agency” as that term is defined at 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C). Address it instead to the Disclosure Officer,
Disclosure Services, Room 1054-MT, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington
20220, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA. This
is the format for “foreign” addresses, as explained in USPS Publication #221.
As James Madison
once wrote, “A popular government without popular information or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy or perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the power knowledge gives."
31. Where
can I find more information, and still protect my privacy?
There are
many civic organizations throughout America who have dedicated their precious
time and energy to acquire and disseminate widely these documented truths about
the Internal Revenue Service and the Internal Revenue Code.
The
Internet’s World Wide Web (“www”) is perhaps the best single source of
information (and disinformation) about the IRS, and the major problems
now confirmed in the IRC and in the mountains of related policies, procedures,
practices, customs, rules, regulations, forms and schedules.
Learn to
become a sophisticated consumer of information, and the knowledge you seek will
be yours to keep and share -- with those you love and endeavor to free from
this terrible plague that persists in America.
Good luck, and may God bless your earnest endeavors to ensure
the blessings of Liberty for ourselves and our Posterity, as stated in the
Preamble to the U.S.
Constitution and in the Declaration of Independence.
To order additional certified and embossed copies of this
document, please send $30.00 in cash or blank U.S. Postal Money Order
to:
Paul A.
Mitchell
c/o Lake Union Mail
117 East
Louisa Street
Seattle
98102-3203
WASHINGTON
STATE, USA
A “blank” U.S. Postal Money Order leaves the “PAY TO” line
blank, permitting us to negotiate it freely.
You may, of course, complete the other half; this allows you to obtain a photocopy
of the cancelled money order from the U.S.
Postal Service without the need for a court order.
Also, be sure to request information about our MOTIONS FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION to freeze all IRS assets and to enjoin IRS from
depositing any tax collections into any account(s) other than the Treasury of the United
States. These MOTIONS were filed in two appeals at
the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco, using FRAP Rule 8 and the special
procedures available to a Private
Attorney General under the RICO laws.
Finally, don’t miss this
opportunity to request more information about our historic APPLICATION FOR
ORDER DISSOLVING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, under a specific authority
granted to the District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) at 18 U.S.C. 1964(a). Refer to DCUS docket #SA CV 02-0382 GLT(ANx), Santa Ana, California.
VERIFICATION
As the Undersigned, I hereby verify, under penalty of perjury,
under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United
States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is
true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and
belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See the Supremacy Clause
for Constitutional authority.
Dated:
______________________________________________________
Signed:
______________________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew
Mitchell, B.A., M.S
Cracking the Code of Internal
Revenue” (all editions),
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